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In recent years, the world of banking has suffered a deep and extensive revolution: 
technological and regulatory advances, together with the ever-increasing development 
of financial markets, have meant that the banking industry must adapt to these tailwinds 
in order to prosper and even survive. The banking industry, characterized in past times 
by a strong oligopolistic trend, saw its market power endangered by the entry of 
competitors who took advantage of the aforementioned development in order to enter 
the business of financing. 
With hindsight, in the past, anyone who needed financing had to go to banks in order to 
meet their needs. Due to the technological development suffered by society, together 
with the entry of new competitors linked to this development and the attempt of certain 
investors to avoid the regulations linked to financing operations, these potential clients 
have a facility never previously acquired to choose from a large number of financing 
options, from those that make up traditional banking (e.g. Banco Santander in Spain) to 
totally new and intricate financing entities or processes. These institutions and alternative 
financing processes are called shadow banking and, in these last years, have played a 
decisive role in the global economy. Therefore, when we talk about shadow banking we 
are talking about a parallel financial system of international character and great 
importance and from which many economic agents take advantage of being able to avoid 
a great amount of legislation linked to the traditional financial industry, not without 
supporting risks for it.  
1.1. Shadow banking: definition and developed activities. 
In a strict sense, the creation of alternative sources of funding is far from new. Butzbach 
(2014) points out how, already in the 15th century, various religious orders created pawn 
shops and savings banks throughout most of European territory. However, if a more 
recent and accurate definition of shadow banking is sought, perhaps the best option 
would be to keep the definition proposed by Paul McCulley in 2007 in the Federal 
Reserve of Kansas City (former director of the investment firm PIMCO). Kodres (2013) 
takes up McCulley's definition, which defines shadow banking as the set of non-financial 
institutions in charge of collecting money from economic agents in order to invest it in 
the long term. To complement this definition, the definition given by the Financial Stability 
Board (2013) could be used, which defines shadow banking as a system of credit 
intermediation made up of entities and activities outside the traditional system. 
Therefore, while McCulley emphasizes the activity of these alternative institutions, the 
FSB highlights their position compared to the traditional financial industry. 
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Once shadow banking has been defined as a general concept, the next step is to 
understand which entities are part of it, as well as how they operate. Authors such as 
Roldán (2020) or Broos et al. (2012) identify, among others, the following participants 
within shadow banking: 
 Money Market Mutual Funds (MMF) where there are investment funds that 
invest in different financial instruments where the return is not guaranteed. There 
are different instruments in which these funds invest such as short term debt, 
government securities, repurchase agreements 
 Financial companies. They are those companies that without being a bank 
make the function of lending money to individuals and companies. 
 Hedge Funds. Private investment companies that manage third party shares by 
selling and repurchasing them. They have a high risk. They are not regulated by 
any institution, hence their virtually unlimited operating capacity. 
 Brokers-Dealers. Person or company that buys and sells shares in the stock 
markets on behalf of a third party, obtaining financing from third parties through 
repurchase agreements. The repurchase agreements are contracts in which one 
of the parties agrees to sell securities to another party and buy them back on a 
certain date and repurchase them at a certain price. 
  As for operations related to shadow banking, authors such as Kodres (2020) or Luttrell 
et al. (2012) summarize it in the following activities: 
 Maturity transformation: shadow banking intermediaries are able to replicate 
the structure by lending at long terms and financing themselves in the markets at 
short term by issuing deposit like liabilities. 
 Credit transformation: it implies the synthetic improvement of the quality of the 
assets issued in the market and perceived by the public as similar to deposits. 
This quality improvement can be carried out through the tranching of the 
underlying risks, or through the inclusion of insurance or similar instruments, such 
as guarantees by conventional financial institutions. 
 Leverage: consists of using debt to finance the operations of these companies. 
Instead of using their own funds, operations are carried out financed with, among 
others, loans. One advantage of this is that it can increase the profitability of the 
company, but it also takes the risk that if that operation financed with money other 
than equity goes wrong, the company may have financial problems. 
 Liquidity Transformation: consists essentially of the market perception of these 
‘deposit-like’ assets by market participants, even though they are being used for 
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the financing of very illiquid assets (High Yield Bonds, direct mortgages, project 
bonds, etc). Again, in this aspect, the existence of liquidity lines by the 
conventional banking system is of great importance in relation to the perception 
of such assets as 'liquid'.   
Understanding the concept of shadow banking, the entities that make it up and the 
activities developed by them, it is convenient to compare this accessory industry with 
traditional banking. Although it is true that shadow banking performs financial 
intermediation activities (attracting funds from surplus units to grant those funds to deficit 
units), there are differences between both types of institutions. On the one hand, 
traditional banking transforms client deposits (which are short term) into loans (long 
term). The profit they make in this operation is called the brokerage margin, which is the 
difference between the interest the bank pays its clients on their deposits and the interest 
the bank charges its clients for lending them money (Roldán, 2020). In order to make the 
business profitable, the interest charged to clients for loans will always be higher than 
the interest they pay on their deposits, and a series of commissions the bank charges 
clients for providing the services should also be added. 
Figure 1. Traditional banking vs shadow banking working process. 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2014) 
Shadow banking, although it works in a similar way, has a wide versatility when it comes 
to establishing sources, instruments and conditions of financing as we have seen before, 
which although it offers a flexibility unthinkable for traditional banking, it is far from 
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problem-free. More precisely, Pozsar et al. (2013) define the intermediation process of 
shadow institutions in 7 steps: 
1. Creation of loans through financing companies. 
2. Accumulation of portfolio loans and issuance of bonds backed by those loans 
(Asset-Backed Commercial Paper or ABCP) 
3. Brokers are responsible for structuring these bonds into Asset Backed Securities 
(ABS). 
4. The accumulation of these ABS is favored through market registrations and their 
financing is favored through repurchase agreements or CDS among other similar 
mechanisms. 
5. These ABS are structured to become Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), 
thus creating ABS-backed bonds, which in turn depend on the initial credits 
granted. 
6. These products are brokered by institutions created specifically for this purpose, 
called Structured Investment Vehicles (SIV) 
7. The desired financing is obtained through these products in the financial markets. 
 
Table 1. Shadow banking intermediation process. 
 
 Source: Pozsar et al. (2010) 
Therefore, and as we will see in more detail throughout this work, shadow banking 
implies the existence of a parallel source of income for financial institutions. By creating 
a complex network with a multitude of variables (different types of assets, different types 
of institutions to store and market these assets, etc.) a system is established that is 
apparently far removed from the traditional financial business. However, as will be seen 





1.2. Shadow banking’s advantages and disadvantages. 
Shadow banking, as every other alternative with respect to a prevailing traditional 
system, offers a series of advantages to economic agents. To have a better 
understanding of the possibilities that shadow banking may be able to offer, it is important 
to inform that banking is a strongly regulated industry, which makes the institutions within 
this industry strongly supervised and tutored when operating. This fact is the main 
advantage of shadow banking: the lack of regulation (Juneja, 2020). This lack of 
regulation allows shadow institutions to carry out more risky operations, which translates 
into a greater capacity to provide financing or invest in projects that involve more risk. 
Associated with this greater operational capacity we find accessory advantages such as 
a greater dynamism in the money supply or an optimization in the agents' portfolios 
associated with the greater operational capacity provided by the creation of derivative 
assets (Gorton and Metrick, 2010). Paradoxically, this additional creation of risk is not 
consistent with the initial purposes of the activities within shadow banking, since, as 
explained by Ağirman et al. (2013), the main idea with which the activities related to 
shadow banking were created was risk management, not risk creation. 
After seeing the main advantage of this alternative system, it is quite intuitive to guess 
the disadvantages associated with it. As it is well specified in any place or institution 
where this type of financial assets created to a greater or lesser extent of the specific 
interests of the participating agents are operated, the management of derivative assets 
implies assuming a great risk. This risk associated with derivative assets is the main 
disadvantage of shadow banking (Central Bank of Ireland, 2020) and the management 
of these assets on a large scale and without control can lead to a dangerous crisis. In 
addition, Wu and Kfoury (2016) make a distinction, breaking down the above risk into 
two risk streams: 
1. Due diligence and credit risk: when granting a loan to a client, traditional banks 
have extensive experience in gathering relevant information to analyze the 
operation and its derived risks, experience that these alternative entities lack (and 
in certain cases want to lack). 
2. Liquidity risk: banks are legally obliged to maintain minimum liquidity reserves 
to avoid risky situations. Shadow institutions lack this regulation, which can leave 
the company exposed to a fortuitous setback. 
Therefore, we are in front of a situation where an operational/risk duality prevails. The 
lack of regulation, as well as the great operational capacity of the institutions within 
shadow banking allows for operations that are totally unthinkable in the traditional 
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banking industry. On the contrary, this great capacity to operate through an infinite 
number of institutions and products, linked to the lack of existing regulation, makes these 
institutions great generators of risk in the financial markets. 
2. Evolution and development of shadow banking. 
Once the definition of shadow banking has been stablished in a general way, as well as 
its components and its acting process the next step is to take a brief tour of its 
contemporary history up to the present day. As will be seen later and, by way of 
background, it can be said that shadow banking played a crucial role in contemporary 
economic history. 
2.1. First steps of the current shadow banking. 
Although it has been commented that alternative banking is not a concept, much less a 
novelty, shadow banking, understood from the current prism, is a relatively recent 
element. Valckx (2014) comments that shadow banking saw an opportunity to flourish 
as a means of alternative financing after the international banking regulation and 
legislation agreement known as Basel I in 1974. The new regulations concerning the 
banking sector implied a series of limits and ties to the financial business of the time, 
which is why an alternative system of capital movement began to be developed. This 
began to grow notably in 1988, after the guidelines for banking legislation and regulation 
were approved in the Basel II agreement, directly related to the Basel I rules. At this time, 
some of the products and methods characteristic of alternative banking began to emerge: 
 Asset securitization: creation of bonds whose profitability is linked to an asset 
package. Explained in more detail in section 2.1.1. 
 Special Investment Vehicle (SIV): Company used to earn margin between 
liabilities and assets. Its strategy consisted in issuing bonds at a low interest rate, 
to capture money that would later be invested in securitization (Chen, 2019).  
 Credit Default Swaps (CDS): financial derivatives that allow transferring the 
credit risk of an asset to a third party in exchange for a premium (Arce et al., 
2010). 
As previously mentioned, the proliferation of this type of financing and speculation tools 
has a direct relationship with the Basel agreements' regulatory standards. The main 
trigger was the fact that banks were assigned a minimum capital to be maintained in 
order to face a series of risks inherent to the banking industry (Moody's, 2011): 
 Credit risk: potential loss arising from the failure of a counterparty to meet 
contractual obligations on a loan. 
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 Operational risk: potential loss derived from an internal failure of the 
organization. 
 Market risk: potential loss derived from a loss of value in the investments made. 
 Exchange rate risk: potential loss derived from changes in foreign exchange 
rates. 
The minimum capital percentage established in Basel II was a minimum of 8% of equity. 
This imposition limited the operational capacity of the bank and increased its costs (e.g. 
costs related to the analysis of operations from a risk perspective). In short, the Basel 
Accords, coupled with the great period of growth in the markets at the end of the 20th 
century, were the perfect breeding ground for the development of shadow banking. 
2.1.1. Asset securitization and shadow banking. 
In order to understand the current situation of shadow banking, the most appropriate 
thing to do is to review its role in the financial crisis of the past decade. To do so, it is 
crucial to understand one of the most widespread processes in this industry in the past 
decade, as well as the disastrous consequences it brought about throughout the global 
economy: asset securitization. 
The process of asset securitization is that which occurs when an issuer called the 
originator creates a financial instrument that can be bought or sold through the grouping 
or merging of assets, forming these assets into a new asset (Chen, 2020). Once these 
new assets have been created, they are launched into the market through the creation 
of a secondary institution called a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), which allows a 
distinction to be made between the risks of the originator and the assets to be placed in 
the SPV. The complete securitization process is shown in detail in figure 2: 
Figure 2. Process of securitization. 
 
  Source: Verma Jivram & Associates (2018) 
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Looking at the securitization process in a more graphic way, the creation of a secondary 
institution is shown as a turning point in all the mechanics involved in asset securitization. 
Therefore, although SPVs have been briefly mentioned, it is worth explaining in more 
detail what they are (Claessens et al., 2012): 
 Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV): a company created specifically for the 
securitization process. This entity will receive the revenues and cash flows 
derived from the bond issue, and it will also be the entity that will repay the debt 
to the banks. In order to avoid risks, these entities are legally separated from the 
bank that is going to securitize the loans. Thus, the main objective is to avoid any 
possible contagion effect in case of bankruptcy. These companies are often 
domiciled in tax havens or in countries with favourable legislation so that the SPV 
is neutral to any tax issues. Due to the bonds issued by the SPV usually have a 
better rating than the originator, the SPV requires a lower amount of equity. That 
is, the same assets can be financed with less equity.  
By creating these entities, the main financial entity manages to avoid or reduce the 
regulation related to this type of debt issuance activities. Therefore, this activity has been 
and still is very popular in shadow banking. 
2.1.2. Shadow banking’s role in the 2008 financial crisis. 
This process of asset creation described above was certainly succulent for many 
institutions in recent years because of the great capacity for configuration it offers and 
the possibility of separating the risk between the parent institution and the institutions 
created specifically for these projects. Therefore, these practices played a decisive role 
in the financial crisis of 2008 (Caprio et al., 2008). More specifically, the massive 
issuance of Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) of dubious ratings was the trigger for the 
crisis of the past decade. According to Kagan (2020) an MBS is an investment product 
of a similar nature to a bond, which is backed by a bank mortgage package of different 
ratings. In short, MBSs are a type of ABS backed by mortgage loans. 
MBSs had a direct relationship with shadow institutions, which marketed them. Due to 
this close relationship, the leverage of the shadow institutions increased in direct 
proportion to the value of these assets, thus giving the possibility of creating greater 
liquidity. However, this situation could only occur when the price of the assets was 
booming. This fact, added to the high liquidity of the North American markets in the pre-
crisis period, exponentially increased the problem of subprimes (high-risk mortgages). 
Similarly, shadow banks began a process of collective and mutual feedback to grow, 
expanding items on their balance sheets through the manipulation of maturities and 
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liquidity of their assets and liabilities. To do so, it was necessary to be within a system 
where these shadow institutions sought and were willing to assume higher leverage 
margins in order to expand as well (Neria and Lira, 2017). For this last reason, a great 
multitude of shadow banks emerged around the globe. 
This alternative financial model based on obtaining profits through the configuration of 
asset packages, added to the joint complicity of the shadow institutions (often counting 
on classic financial institutions in the background) unleashed the greed of many. This 
greed led to increasingly risky and less transparent levels of fraudulent treatment of asset 
deals. They masked a multitude of high-risk assets under a low-risk ABS rating in order 
to attract investors by claiming the low risk of these assets without the latter knowing that 
the underlying assets were far from safe. In a multilateral framework with implications for 
many institutions, the rating companies (in charge of valuing these bonds) also 
contributed to the formation of this crisis through the incorrect valuation of these ABS. 
These companies also had the advantage that their sector was an oligopoly made up of 
three companies: Standard and Poor's, Moody's and Fitch ratings, so their ratings could 
not be compared with other rating companies. This meant that inexperienced investors 
had no choice but to abide by these ratings. In addition, the United States was facing the 
end of a real estate bubble, which directly affected the underlying assets of this entire 
bond structure. When people began to realize that these assets were very high risk, they 
suddenly began to sell their positions, and the institutions that were financing the shadow 
banks, seeing the high risk of the underlying, stopped financing them. In order to be able 
to make payments, the shadow banks had to sell the assets, lowering prices accordingly 
and eventually causing a depreciation in many items on the banks' balance sheets. The 
lack of regulation and the little knowledge of these institutions meant that the effect could 
not be isolated and extended to the rest of the economy. 
2.2. Shadow banking at the present time. 
After the financial crisis of 2008, the regulators were forced to establish greater measures 
for the financial sector, as they were the main cause of the debacle with their practices. 
Therefore, in 2010 a package of regulatory reforms was proposed within the Basel III 
Agreement. One of the most talked about measures was the implementation of the 





According to the proposed regulation of Basel III, this ratio should be 7% compared to 
the 4% established in Basel II. As a consequence of this new requirement, the banks 
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decided to transform risky assets from hybrid debt into shares and reserves (Value Walk, 
2015), which is just another example of the high accounting engineering capacity that 
banking companies have. However, these are somehow regulated in a general, public 
and transparent way, to the detriment of shadow banking. Although there have been 
attempts to regulate this alternative banking, they have not been very successful due to 
the great complexity of this intricate parallel industry (Claessens et al., 2012)  
This great flexibility derived from the lack of regulation has meant that shadow banking 
has not stopped growing until today, despite how risky it has proved to be. In order to 
have a greater vision of the great relevance that shadow banking has in our days, Zabala 
and Josse (2018) followed the evolution of the total value of shadow assets and put them 
in relation to the value of the GPD of 20 countries, which represent 80% of the world's 
GDP and 90% of the value of the world's financial assets. 
Figure 3. Shadow banking evolution referred as GDP percentage and UDS 
trillion, 2002 – 2014. 
 
Source: Zabala and Josse (2018) and FSB (2014) 
In general terms, we can see a general increase in the value of shadow banking in this 
period. In terms of GDP, it is remarkable that the value of these assets has exceeded 
the GDP of these countries in almost the entire period analyzed, standing at around 
120% of value over GDP on average. As for the absolute value, it has followed a path of 
constant growth, managing to almost triple its total value in these 13 years of study.  
For its part, the Financial Stability Board, an institution which regularly carries out an 
exhaustive analysis of the evolution of financial assets, records a multitude of data on 
these assets each year for publication at a later date. Within the category Monitoring 
14 
 
Universe of Non-banking Financial Intermediation (MUNFI), the FSB classifies the 
following elements as shadow banking: 
1. Insurance corporations. 
2. Pension funds. 
3. Other Financial Intermediaries (OFIs). 
4. Financial auxiliaries. 
Following this classification, the data recorded in the FSB report (2019) are as follows: 
Table 2. Macro-mapping of the financial system, 2017. 
 
Source: FSB (2019) 
The FSB (2019) registers a global MUNFI volume of 184 trillion US dollars in 2017, 
compared to 65 trillion US dollars in 2011 (FSB, 2013). To have a quick perspective, in 
2017 the total value of financial assets worldwide was 382 trillion US dollars, which 
implies that shadow banking represents 48% of the value of total assets in 2017.  
Figure 4. Assets of financial intermediaries, 2003 – 2017. 
 
     Source: FSB (2019) 
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In general terms, there is a crossover trend in the market for financial intermediaries: 
while traditional banks are losing their share, the OFIs are claiming that share for 
themselves. On the other hand, both traditional banking and the group of institutions 
within shadow banking are growing over time, with traditional banking and OFIs standing 
out. 
This situation may be due to two interrelated causes: first, as far as traditional banking 
is concerned, poverty is continuously decreasing during the last years (World Bank, 
2020) which makes more people meet certain conditions necessary to access traditional 
banking products. Consequently, it is understandable that banking assets show an 
upward trend during the last years. As far as shadow products are concerned, the growth 
of these products can be justified by the growing financial culture that exists in the 
population. What used to be a matter of a chosen few is now becoming increasingly 
widespread among the common population, mainly due to online disclosure. 
Consequently, more and more people know about these products and how to access 
them. 
Table 3. Shadow banking as a DGP percentage, 2012. 
 
          Source: Arora and Zhang (2019) 
In this table the total volume in USD trillion of shadow banking in different economic 
areas can be seen. In the United States it represents 160% of the US GDP, in the Euro 
zone it represents 180% of the Euro zone GDP, in the UK it represents 363% of the UK 
GDP or in Japan it represents 67% of the Japanese GDP. In contrast, in China, shadow 
banking in 2012 represented 60% of GDP. However, none of the countries mentioned 
above had such a high shadow banking growth rate as China. The case of China will be 
studied in greater depth later on, but it can be anticipated that the average annualised 






2.3. Growth of shadow banking and financing to companies and individuals. 
One of the main reasons why shadow banking is growing is because the world's small 
and medium enterprises have difficulty accessing traditional financing from banks. 
Before 2004, most of this financing came from banks, but from that year onwards shadow 
banking financing for these companies grew exponentially. In the period of the 2008 
crisis, the financing of these companies was greatly affected, but in the years following 
this crisis, financing was gradually recovered, mainly from shadow banking (Adrian and 
Jones, 2017).  
The growth of shadow banking through access to financing by the most disadvantaged 
groups has been a constant in recent decades. This phenomenon is mainly present in 
developing countries. One of the first notable cases was that of the founding of the 
Grameen Bank by Muhammad Yunus in 1983 (Candial et al., 2011). With this project, 
Yunus sought to finance Bangladeshi citizens who were looking for entrepreneurship but 
the usual lines of credit were inaccessible to them. In China this process also took place 
and is partly responsible for the economic explosion of the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries. 
Table 4. Interest rates for a 90-days loan, (worldwide approximation) 2014 
– 2015. 
 
      Source: Li (2014) 
This table shows the high average cost of financing. Therefore, it is far from strange to 
think that many capital seekers seek alternative methods of financing through non-
traditional institutions and methods. 
3. Shadow banking: the case of China. 
Although it has been seen before that shadow banking is a global phenomenon, there is 
a country that has developed a shadow banking system with its own peculiar 
characteristics. This country is China, a country in constant evolution and development. 
After the 1978 Chinese Economic Reform by the Communist Party of China and the 
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transition to a market economy, this country has experienced growth rates of over 10% 
in many years until well into the 21st century, becoming the second world power in 2010 
after these boom years. Currently, although its growth rate is lower nowadays, it is not 
negligible, since in recent years it is stabilizing at around 6-7% per year, although it is 
true that growth is increasingly lower, something typical of developed economies. 
This high growth in the country led, as is logical, to the development of a strong, complex 
and large financial system, which today is probably the second largest financial system 
in the world. Within this system, a network of institutions was developed in China that 
provided financing to those agents in need of capital. This alternative financing model, 
as mentioned above, allowed access to capital for those who could not access traditional 
financing channels. Therefore, this ability to provide funds to Chinese entrepreneurs of 
the time was one of the multiple causes of the Chinese economic miracle mentioned 
above.  
Figure 5. Yearly China’s GDP growth, 1975-2020. 
 
    Source: Macrotrends (2020) 
At this point, a first conceptual distinction must be made between Chinese shadow 
banking and that of other economic areas. While, as we have seen above, Western 
definitions of shadow banking highlight its condition as ‘outside the system’ in a 
somewhat negative sense, in China there is no attempt to provide shadow banking with 
a negative conception of it, at least not officially.  Liangsheng (2014) describes how the 
People's Bank of China (PBOC) defines shadow banking as all those instruments that 
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perform credit intermediation functions, which banks are responsible for (liquidity, 
maturing and risk transformation), but which reduce the burden of traditional banking 
regulation. Therefore, the official definition of the Chinese central bank places great 
emphasis on highlighting the dynamism of these institutions and processes due to their 
lack of regulation. This conception is diametrically opposed to that disseminated in the 
West, since the lack of regulation enjoyed by these institutions is seen as risky. 
Of course, not only is the way of understanding shadow banking different, but its own 
structure and functioning differs from Western models. Pozsar et al. (2010) comment 
that, while in the US banks do not sell these products directly, but through third party 
institutions, in China it is the Chinese banks themselves that issue this type of product 
and channel the income to these third party companies. Therefore, while in the West the 
star shadow product is ABS, in China they are loans to economic agents who cannot 
access the traditional financial system. Another difference that should be highlighted is 
that the vast majority of Chinese shadow products are offered and remain within the local 
economy, so that foreign investment in this system is insignificant compared to the global 
volume. Finally, China has developed shadow banking concentrated in a few institutions, 
which are more accessible to economic agents than Western shadow banking. In short, 
if we had to summarize Chinese shadow banking, we could summarize everything in the 
following points (Elhers et al. 2018): 
1. Banks are the central element of Chinese shadow banking. 
2. Shadow banking in China offers alternative savings instruments and loans to 
groups that cannot access traditional financing systems. 
3. Shadow banking is generally closely interrelated within the financial system. 
4. Low complexity of this system. 
5. Chinese shadow banking enjoys a generalised real guarantee from the issuers 
themselves. 
Figure 6. Chinese shadow banking as % GDP, 2000-2016. 
 
                       Source: Matthews (2019) 
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In recent years, one can see how the volume of Chinese shadow banking has multiplied. 
While in 2000, shadow banking in China accounted for less than 10% of GDP, by 2015 
it will account for 90%. The main reason for this growth is the fact that the Chinese 
government itself, through the PBOC, has encouraged the development of financing for 
economic agents through these alternative channels. However, in recent years the 
government itself has increased the regulatory burden of Chinese shadow banking. This 
fact, together with a continued growth of GDP in China, leads to the downward trend of 
the relative importance of shadow banking in 2016. 
3.1. Chinese’s shadow banking’s products. 
As we have seen in the introduction to the section, Chinese shadow banking presents a 
series of differences with respect to Western models. As you would expect, the different 
way this system works in China means that it has to create its own products. The 
existence of these products is based on the fact that the banks themselves are the main 
agents of Chinese shadow banking. As banks are in the front line, products such as ABS 
can be dispensed with in order to offer products that provide a more direct link between 
lender and borrower. Therefore, the Chinese system seems to be mainly based on a 
system of funding by depositors, who purchase products that we will see below. 
For convenience, and in view of the insistence of the data from China to be expressed 
in Chinese Yuan (CNY from now on) without any conversion, a reference table is 
attached with the USD/CNY exchange rates with the values at the end of the year in 
order to be able to make a quick conversion of the figures presented. It is also worth 
noting that China is certainly zealous about data transparency, so several data presented 
below will not cover the last few years. 
Table 5. Currency Exchange table USD/CNY (end of year) 2010, 2020. 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
USD/CNY 6.65 6.32 6.24 6.06 6.22 6.46 6.96 6.58 6.88 7 6.69 
Source: XE (2020) 
In general, it seems that the CNY has not suffered any significant oscillation in this period 
against the dollar, which can be interpreted as an indicator of the strength of the country 
in this last decade. Although China has an a priori weak currency against the USD, 
China's greater economic growth against the US linked to growth disparities in the money 
supply of both currencies has meant that in recent years there have been no abrupt 
changes in exchange rates. In fact, in recent years the CNY has been deliberately 
devalued against the USD in order to make Chinese exports cheaper. 
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Figure 7. The Chinese shadow banking – banking nexus, 2012. 
 
         Source: Sheng and Chow Soon (2015) 
As it can be seen, the official Chinese banking is directly related to all the shadow 
products marketed in the Chinese economy. From the subscription of most corporate 
bonds to the securitization of assets through its trust companies, Chinese banking is the 
central axis of Chinese shadow banking, creating its own system of interrelated products. 
3.1.1. Wealth Management Products (WMPs). 
WMPs represent the main product of Chinese shadow banking. Perry and Weltewitz 
(2015) define these products as investments that offer fixed returns well above those set 
for deposits. With the funds raised, banks invest in sectors that are often restricted from 
traditional bank credit due to regulatory issues. Although the main ultimate manipulators 
of these products and the funds obtained are the banks themselves, these are usually 
backed by third party companies that serve as a channel between the origin and 
destination of the investment. Within WMPs, we can differentiate between two main 
types (Jingan et al., 2015): WMPs issued by banks and those issued by other non-bank 






Figure 8. WMPs composition. 
 
    Source: Li (2014) 
The process of reversing WMPs is detailed in the graph above. The banks (or other 
entities as we will see above) issue the WMPs. These WMPs are linked to a certain 
maturity and profitability. When they are contracted, banks accumulate the principal 
received in a pool, with which they invest in a certain amount of assets with different 
characteristics with which they will obtain the necessary profitability to pay the 
contractors of the WMPs that have financed these investments. Logically, the institution 
issuing the WMPs obtains a higher yield than that offered to the contractors, this being 
the intermediation margin of this process. 
Logically, this shadow product and the investment process it entails is not without its 
flaws. Li (2014) comments that one of the main flaws is the degree of opacity in the 
investment composition of these products, which makes it extremely difficult to properly 
track investments. This situation clashes with moderately similar products such as 
traditional investment funds, in which it is not too complicated to know the composition 
of their portfolios. Another problem is the fact that there is no secondary market for these 
products, so you have to keep it until maturity. 
As mentioned above, banks are usually the main issuers and managers of WMPs, 
generally issuing two types of WMPs:  
1. Product-Return-Guaranteed WMPs (PRG-WMPs): these issues are backed by 
the issuing entity, either the principal contribution or the agreed return. 
2. Non-principal guaranteed WMPs: this product is totally variable. The bank does 
not guarantee any yield. 
On the other hand, banks issued by non-banks have a similar operation to WMPs issued 
by banks. The main difference lies in the fact that these companies cannot enjoy the 
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guarantee that a bank can afford, since they are backed to a greater or lesser extent by 
the Chinese government. Also, companies can sell their MWPs through the various 
banks in exchange for a payment to the bank for their services. 
Figure 9. WMP product types, 2014-2016. 
 
         Source: Elhers et al. (2018) 
Figure 10. WMP maturities, 2014. 
 
 Source: Perry and Weltewitz (2015) 
The following graph shows how the WMPs are, for the most part, very short maturation 
products, with more than 80% of the WMPs emitted within a maturation period of less 
than 1 year. This entails an implicit counterparty risk, as the funds collected by WMPs 
are invested in short maturing, high yield assets (with the associated illiquidity and risk 
taking) and Chinese banks assume a potentially high collateral payment. In terms of the 
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most widely used types of WMPs, WMPs not covered by issuers are the most widely 
traded, accounting for 67% of total WMPs in 2014 and almost 80% in 2016. This is due 
to the higher profitability of these shadow products which, linked to the lack of risk limits 
by the Chinese authorities, allows banks to configure these investments and for them to 
be acquired by economic agents. 
Currently, WMPs are the most widely used shadow product in China, with a record 
amount of 26.3 trillion CNY (3.9 trillion USD) in the hands of Chinese companies, banks 
and individuals in the first half of 2020 (ChinaGoAbroad, 2020). This figure, which is 
growing, is behaving contrary to expectations, as since 2014 the Chinese government 
has begun a process of regulatory increase for certain shadow products in order to 
safeguard the country's financial health. Nevertheless, Chinese shadow banking has 
experienced growth in recent years, with the value of WMPs increasing by 11.8% in the 
first half of 2020 and WMPs being bought and sold on the financial markets for 84 trillion 
CNY (12.57 trillion USD) in the same period. Therefore, WMPs are by no means a 
passing fad, but the main alternative investment route in China, a route that seems to 
have no end in the short and medium term. 
Figure 11. Share of China’s WMPs by holding groups, 2013-2018. 
 
Source: Bloomberg (2019) 
Individual investors are the main investors in WPS, holding about 60% of the total shares 
in WMPs in recent years. Furthermore this figure has increased in 2018, representing 
now more than 80%. On the other hand, companies have gone from representing around 
25% to barely 5%, which leads us to think that they are now focusing on other means of 
financing and investment. Finally, financial institutions are following a more or less similar 
path to companies, since after a sudden interest in these products in 2015 and 2016, the 
latter stopped being interested in WMPs. This downward trend in corporate entities is 
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due to the risk involved in these products and, despite the PBOC's attempt to increase 
the regulatory burden on them to provide guarantees, this has not been sufficient to give 
these agents the necessary confidence. 
3.1.2. Entrusted loans. 
The second most commercialized shadow product in China are the commissioned or risk 
loan, commonly known as entrusted loans. Allen et al. (2019) define entrusted loans as 
loans made by non-bank companies whose recipients are other companies. For this 
purpose, they use banks or a third company, which provide the loans on behalf of the 
companies granting the loans. For the performance of these services, the institution on 
behalf of which the loan is granted receives commissions. In addition, trust companies 
do not bear any risk for providing this service, since the final risk of the investment falls 
on the concessionary company. The basic process followed is as follows: 
Figure 12. Entrusted loan creation process. 
 
         Source: Lu et al. (2015) 
These products are aimed at all those less favoured economic agents who cannot 
access traditional banking due to their characteristics (Elhers et al. 2018). These 
products were responsible for the fact that a large number of Chinese citizens whose 
access to banking was difficult could obtain financing for their investments. For this 
reason, this product was really popular in China in the 1990s and early 2000s. The lack 
of regulation was what allowed access to so many borrowers. However, from 2007 
onwards, a series of regulations altered the structure of this market, which, although it 





Figure 13. China entrusted loans’ volume (CNY billion) 2006-2017. 
 
    Source: Zero Hedge (2017) 
It can be seen how entrusted loans have been growing slightly in recent years, although 
unevenly in the last period studied. Starting in 2013, we can see periods where the value 
of entrusted loans reaches 400 billion CNY (60 billion USD) while in others it is close to 
zero. Zero Hedge (2017) directly relates this irregular behaviour to the sensations 
experienced by Chinese investors, who seem to suffer from periods of conservatism in 
line with the behaviour of Chinese institutions and the Chinese economy in general. 
Figure 14. Types of trusts, 2012-2015. 
 
      Source: Elhers et al. (2018) 
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The trust companies used in these operations can be grouped into three types 
depending on the type of intermediation they carry out in the shadow credit 
process and the public they are aimed at: 
1. Single pecuniary trusts: directly related to the main banks and other large 
investors. These trust companies are tailor-made for each investor. Their main 
function is to channel WMP funds into assets of a very specific nature. 
2. Collective pecuniary trusts: these companies gather funds from various 
investors and invest in a series of assets. Their main investors are financial 
institutions. 
3. Non-pecuniary property trusts: these companies manage non-monetary 
assets (e.g. commodities) usually on behalf of a single client. 
3.1.3. Bankers’ acceptances and commercial acceptances. 
Generally speaking, a bank acceptance is a fixed-rate loan used primarily to finance 
commercial transactions (TDBank, 2019): 
1. Permission to postpone the maturity of the payment to be received or made as 
an importer/exporter, but with the direct and unconditional obligation of the 
drawee bank. 
2. Method of financing the sale of goods at a fixed rate. 
In China, this method of financing was officially launched by PBOC in 2013 as a means 
to give shadow banking a greater role in the creation of credit in China, having previously 
existed analogues recognized as a similar product but without institutional acceptance. 
McMahon (2019) explains how, after their official launch, these products enjoyed great 
popularity in the years to come because their classification made it possible to avoid 
regulatory barriers. However, in recent years this shadow product has ceased to be so 
popular, as economic traders are opting to carry out credit operations among 








Figure 15. Undiscounted bankers’ acceptances vs. undiscounted commercial 
acceptances, 2018-2019. 
 
Source: McMahon (2019) 
The graph confirms the above commented: while bank acceptances are maintained and 
even lose volume in certain periods, business acceptances are growing steadily, 
experiencing a growth of around 30% between February 2018 and February 2019. If this 
trend continues, perhaps in the long term the banks will lose their main role as 
intermediaries in the control of this type of shadow assets in a natural way, so a future 
regulatory review for this type of transaction by Chinese institutions could be expected 
so that the banks will once again have control of these operations. It should be 
remembered that China is a country that opts for the centralization and institutionalization 
of a large part of the aspects related to its country, so the above assumption would not 
be far-fetched. 
3.2. China’s shadow banking summary. 
This last section will summarize the information provided throughout this section in order 
to provide an overview of what has been discussed. Additionally, it will be seen how it 







Figure 16. Components of shadow banking in China (CNY trillions), 2010-2019. 
 
Source: Allen and Gu (2020) 
Finally, this graph serves as a summary of all the above. This graph includes the main 
types of products and their relevance within Chinese shadow banking. In general terms, 
you can see how Wealth Management Products and Entrusted loans are the products 
with the most value within this system, representing half of it in all the periods shown. On 
the other hand, shadow products appear to be growing or maintaining their volume, with 
the exception of bank acceptances issued to importers and exporters, which appear to 
be declining since 2016. Likewise, the global value of Chinese shadow banking seems 
to have grown largely in a short period of time, from around 15 trillion CNY (approx. USD 
2.24 trillion) to around 60 trillion CNY in 2019 (approx. USD 8.96 trillion). 
The global evolution of the figures of Chinese shadow banking is perfectly in line with 
figure 6. This reveals the close relationship in China between the superficial economic 
system and the shadow system. This fact could confirm the financing possibilities that 
this alternative system offers to Chinese citizens, allowing them to undertake and invest 
even without fulfilling the necessary requirements to be able to obtain financing from 
Chinese banks. Therefore, the greater the entrepreneurship of the Chinese population 







As we have seen, shadow banking is a topic that became known worldwide relatively 
few years ago. It is certainly a delicate subject, since, although it is true that its great 
capacity to generate risk makes specific regulation necessary, it is difficult to ever 
seriously consider establishing effective regulation. However, if it were considered and 
even applied, it would most likely be ineffective. This is because shadow banking is not 
a specific institution or type of business, but rather it encompasses a great tangle of 
interconnected institutions that carry out some financing activity outside conventional 
limits. In a strict sense, and from the western prism, we can only distinguish the fact that 
banks are not the main agents involved (directly) In fact, one of the purposes of shadow 
banking in the West is to separate certain activities carried out by traditional banks 
through this complicated alternative financial system. 
As for the predominant shadow banking systems in the world, two types have been 
distinguished: the Western system and the Chinese system. The first stands out for its 
attempt to hide the root of this system, which are largely traditional financial entities. 
Western shadow banking, by means of securitization and the use of it to carry out certain 
operations of dubious morality through its accessory institutions through the 
manipulation of asset packages with the implicit complicity of several satellite industries 
of the financial system (e.g. rating agencies) caused a crisis of a global nature, the effects 
of which are still noticeable today in certain aspects. Despite subsequent attempts to 
regulate and harden both traditional and shadow banking, this is a system that will not 
disappear in the West in the short term, since there are many interests in maintaining it 
and there is a great multitude of agents directly and indirectly related to it. 
As for the shadow banking developed in China, it has a peculiarity that makes it stand 
out from the Western model of shadow banking. This curiosity lies in the fact that 
traditional banking not only does not hide its presence in this system, but its presence is 
seen as a seal of guarantee by Chinese investors. Of course, Chinese shadow banking 
has a series of products of its own which, although they have certain similarities with 
Western shadow products, have characteristics that make them unique, perhaps the 
most important being the banks' guarantee on certain operations. On the other hand, in 
Chinese shadow banking it is also common to create subsidiary entities to carry out a 
multitude of operations within this industry. Of course, China is not interested (at least 
not to any great extent) in this alternative system falling, since a great multitude of 




Finally, with all that has been analyzed throughout the work, it is to be expected that 
shadow banking will continue to grow more and more globally. The growing greed of 
investors, together with the increasing regulation of public bodies that try to mitigate 
financial risk as much as possible in the traditional financial system, is a perfect breeding 
ground for the proliferation of this alternative financial system. If we add to this the current 
and future technological development that allows and will allow more efficient operations 
in less and less time and the capacity of adaptation and mimicry of shadow banking to 
the panorama presented at each moment, it is logical to think that this system is far from 
being fully exploited and will continue to expand for a long season in one form or another. 
Especially considering that this alternative financing system means the possibility of 
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